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DID RODNEY GET IT WRONG?

Europe Underdeveloped Africa but Enslaved People Were Not Always Purchased with Rubbish

ANA LUCIA ARAUJO

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa by historian Walter Rodney had a significant impact on the scholarship of Africa, the Atlantic slave trade, and colonialism. Rodney's book was not a new endeavor. He had already presented similar results in a previous journal article published in 1966 and explored in depth in his doctoral dissertation defended at the School of Oriental and African Studies in that same year, and then published as a book in 1970.¹ Rodney's book came out in the aftermath of the independence of most African countries at the summit of the Cold War era, during the decline of the Black Power movement, and in the years following the assassination of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States. Rodney himself was killed one decade after the publication of what was his most influential book.²

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa engaged the theories of underdevelopment and dependency advanced by scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank and Celso Furtado.³ Yet, Rodney was the only one of them who dedicated an entire book to Africa. It was the first systematic effort to show how social and economic inequalities between Europe and Africa emerged alongside the development of the Atlantic slave trade. Among Africanist scholars, the responses to Rodney's book were built along racial lines. Whereas several white Africanist scholars in Europe and North America disagreed with his conclusions, black Africanist scholars, some of them working in the global north, tended to support the book's thesis. Fifty years later, a growing number of recent works by a newer generation of historians have reembraced Rodney's thesis.⁴ In this essay, my goal is to revisit two main debates. First,

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Rodney's thesis about the demographic impact of the Atlantic slave trade on the African continent. Second, although new research on the history of slavery and the Atlantic slave trade has challenged Rodney's claims that enslaved Africans were acquired with rubbishy items, I also argue that European traders cheated African agents in some instances. Rodney underscored that as the Atlantic slave trade evolved African rulers started requesting specific items. Like him, I will conclude this essay by also stressing that during the Atlantic slave trade African rulers and middlemen developed specific tastes and demanded very particular items, including luxurious objects.

Rodney contended that slavery as a mode of production did not exist in any African society until the fifteenth century.⁵ He also highlighted that a variety of currencies such as "salt, cloth, iron hoes, and cowry shells" already existed in Africa earlier before the rise of the Atlantic slave trade.⁶ More recently, several historians have also showed how these numerous currencies were employed in West Central Africa and West Africa during the era of the Atlantic slave trade.⁷ Rodney argued that whereas Africa "helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion . . . Western Europe helped to underdevelop Africa."⁸ In this reasoning Africa became dependent on Europe, which controlled maritime expansion. Europeans purchased goods such as cloth in India in order to acquire enslaved Africans to extract resources such as gold in Central and South America, that in its turn was used to obtain goods such as spices and silks from Asia.

Sometimes Rodney refers to Africans as absolute victims, it is true. In some instances, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* lacked nuances. But these flaws can also be explained by the fact that when the book was published more detailed studies about specific regions were still to be written. For example, Rodney states that during the era of the Atlantic slave trade Europeans dominated the coasts of Africa where "if necessary forts could be built."⁹ Of course, the Portuguese ruled Angola earlier before the scramble for Africa, and on the Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin, European powers could certainly build forts with granted permission. Still, in the ports of the Loango coast from where almost two million enslaved Africans were shipped to the Americas, Europeans were not allowed to build permanent structures. Yet, Rodney may have not known this information when he was writing his book as the only existing study in English focusing on the history of the Loango coast external trade was also published in 1972.¹⁰ Enslaved Africans were obviously victims, but for the most part of the time during the era of the Atlantic slave trade, African elites and intermediaries willfully accepted to provide human beings in exchange for Europe goods.

Rodney emphasizes European search for gold in West Africa as part of the development of a capitalist economy in which gold coins were increasingly

used currencies. Yet, although Europeans obtained these resources from Africa, the continent became the most important supplier of enslaved people to western traders. While undervaluing Africans' agency, Rodney also tended to underestimate the importance of indigenous slavery in the Americas, especially in the mining regions of South America. Rodney also minimized the early importance of Christianity in the Kingdom of Kongo starting in the late fifteenth century.¹¹ Still, he underscored that except for some regions of Atlantic Africa, such as Portuguese Angola, Europeans did not use military power to conquer and explore African resources during this period.

Rodney explained how a series of factors ensured European domination through the underdevelopment of Africa during the rise of the slave trade. First, Europeans had superior technology, even though there were exceptions to these advantages. Second, Rodney insisted that it "was in Europe that the nation-state reached an advanced stage" a factor used as a "measure of 'civilization.'"¹² In contrast, he situated "African development up to the fifteenth century at a level that was below mature, class-ridden feudalism."¹³ These factors facilitated European influence. Therefore, the introduction of consumer goods increased the power of African rulers, social stratification, and ultimately contributed to increased warfare with the goal of producing prisoners to be sold into slavery. Of course, West African and Western African societies occasionally resisted against selling captives, but resistance was usually short lived. Still, Rodney basically argued that the deportation of enslaved Africans to the Americas was a response to external influences.

Rodney also recognized the contribution of historian Eric Williams' classic book *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944) in *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, by rightfully insisting "that Europe became the center of a worldwide system and that it was European capitalism which set slavery and the Atlantic slave trade in motion."¹⁴ Rodney followed Williams' statement that Europeans purchased enslaved Africans with *pacotilles* consisting of sundry items and gewgaws such as beads.¹⁵ Hence, Rodney argued that the rise of inequalities between Europe and Africa was, among other factors, associated with the European ability to "unload on the African continent goods which had become unsalable in Europe . . . such as old sheets, cast-off uniforms, technologically outdated firearms, and lots of odds and ends."¹⁶

Following other dependency scholars, he saw slavery as "useful for early accumulation of capital" but still too "rigid for industrial development."¹⁷ Today this claim can be partially challenged. Historians of the second slavery have also showed that beyond early accumulation of capital, the production of cotton, sugar, and coffee in the United States, Cuba, and Brazil that derived from plantation slavery was vital for the rise of industrial capitalism.¹⁸ Despite these pitfalls, Rodney also underscored that racism was "an integral

part of the capitalist mode of production,” a dimension brought to light in recent years by other scholars such as Charles Mills, Achille Mbembe, and Jemima Pierre.¹⁹

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa is also among the very first books to respond to Philip Curtin’s census that estimated that approximately 9,566,000 enslaved Africans disembarked alive in the Americas.²⁰ Today, updated numbers in the *Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* indicate that nearly 10,702,000 enslaved people disembarked alive in the Americas between 1501 and 1866, therefore confirming Curtin’s assessment.²¹ Although Rodney never attempted to calculate the volume of the Atlantic slave trade, he emphasized that existing numbers were deficient. He explained that these gaps were not only because of missing records and the illegal slave trade but also because the existing numbers did not include Africans who were killed during the wars that provided prisoners to slave traders, traveling from the interior to the coast, and during the long waiting period prior to the embarkation to the Americas.²²

Rodney also stressed that there was no way that the loss of inventive young people for the Atlantic slave trade has not badly affected the continent. He also rightly expressed his concern as how the then-new numbers, lower than expected, could be politically used by white historians to minimize the impact of the Atlantic slave trade on the African continent. Rodney was right, as two years before the publication of his book, John D. Fage had already argued in an article that it was impossible to offer one general answer about the impact of the Atlantic slave trade that would be applicable to all areas of West Africa. Fage basically stated that not only was the Atlantic slave trade not harmful for Africa, but also that the human drain provoked by the trade was not decisive.²³ Later, historians Christopher C. Wrigley and Joseph Inikori contested Fage’s conclusions.²⁴ But other historians such as John K. Thornton insisted that the Atlantic slave trade had no significant impact on Angola’s food production and demography.²⁵ By considering the latest Curtin estimates, Fage’s conclusion was opposed to Rodney’s findings. For Fage, the Atlantic slave trade did not have decisive negative impacts on West African societies.

In the years that followed the publication of *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, historians, most of them white men based in universities in Europe and the United States, continued arguing over the estimates of the Atlantic slave trade and refuting the notion that the Atlantic slave trade had any major demographic impact on the continent. These conclusions were not shared by later scholars. For example, Patrick Manning argued that the growth of slavery in Africa was due to the external demand for an African workforce. According to him, slave exports hindered demographic growth. Moreover, in

certain regions, the export of enslaved Africans not only provoked population reduction but also modified the population profile regarding age, sex, and family structure. Manning also argued that slave price variation provoked important changes in slavery in Africa during the nineteenth century. When the external demand for slaves decreased, the use of slave labor on African soil expanded. Manning concluded that the African population would be larger than it is today if the Atlantic slave trade had not existed. According to him, this population reduction was not only due to the deportation of Africans but also to the disturbance caused by displacement and the rise of mortality.²⁶

In 1983, Paul E. Lovejoy argued in a new book that before the fifteenth century, slavery was not a widespread institution in Africa, confirming Rodney's statement in *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* more than a decade after its publication.²⁷ For Lovejoy, although the institution of slavery existed in the fifteenth century, there were no slave societies in Africa. Yet, he argued that Islam, the European market, and other political and economic factors had an impact on the development of slavery on African soil that progressively transformed slavery into a central institution.²⁸ The debates continued during the 1980s. In 1987 and 1988, David Eltis and Lawrence C. Jennings revisited the volume of the Atlantic slave trade and the economic development of Africa during the colonial period by minimizing the impact of the Atlantic slave trade and the consequences of the suppression of the slave trade in the continent.²⁹ Lovejoy challenged the demographic model developed by Eltis and Jennings, by emphasizing the importance of the impact of the trade in African societies and the need to understand the various elements that contributed to placing Africa in an international slave system that included Europe, the Americas, and the Muslim world.³⁰ By examining the volume of the Atlantic slave trade and the regional and ethnic origins of the enslaved population, and taking into account the population's profile based on age and sex, Lovejoy maintained that the slave trade provoked population reduction and an acceleration in the development of slavery in Africa.

On the eve of the end of the Cold War Era, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* continued generating debates along racial lines among white male academics. In 1989, John D. Fage published again a paper in which, despite not contesting Lovejoy's "transformations thesis," he challenged Rodney's arguments developed in 1966 and 1972. He pointed out that Rodney "consciously represented the black peoples exploited through the Atlantic slave trade and slavery and by subsequent colonialism" and argued that Rodney "was a romantic, falling for the myth of the 'noble savage,' believing in an ideal and idyllic pre-colonial 'Merrie Africa' [. . .]." After referring to Africans

as “savages,” Fage finally added that he did not question “Rodney’s vision of an ideal African society which was poisoned by burgeoning European capitalism because [Rodney had a] different ethnic or intellectual inheritance, but because [he could not] see that it accords with the reality.”³¹ This late, cowardly and histrionic criticism showed how the discussion on the volume of the Atlantic slave trade and the impact of the Atlantic slave trade in Africa was not only a historiographical debate. It was also a racialized and politicized debate among the groups who inherited social and racial privileges and inequalities generated by the Atlantic slave trade and European colonization.

Fage’s article also marked a turning point in the debate on the demographic impact. In 1989, when the Soviet Union and eastern European communist regimes were collapsing, historians increasingly questioned various aspects of Marxist historiography that dominated slavery studies in Europe and the Americas. At this stage, the debate on the volume of the Atlantic slave trade and the demographic impact was gradually reaching the public arena as well. Perhaps for the first time during this debate, a white European historian explicitly attacked a black historian in a written piece by relying not only on historical arguments but also on arguments grounded in his interlocutor’s race and political position. Rodney, who was assassinated in Guyana ten years earlier, was no longer alive to respond to Fage’s vicious attack. But in 1994, based on the theory of dependence and underdevelopment and evoking André Gunder Frank and Paul Baran, Inikori also brought the debate to the political arena. Revisiting Fage and Rodney’s work, Inikori denounced the “ideological processes” associated with the study of the history of the Atlantic slave trade and slavery in Africa.³² As an active participant in these debates, he knew the discussion was not merely ideological but rather racialized.

In recent years other historians have also agreed with Rodney’s conclusions. Concerned with global inequalities, and relying on the vast archival work and scholarship produced over the past five decades, historian Toby Green developed a more detailed explanation for the imbalances between Europe and Africa in his recent book *A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution*. Green argues that during the rise of the Atlantic slave trade until the eighteenth century, Africa exported hard currencies such as gold that retained value, whereas African societies kept importing soft currencies such as cowry shells, copper, cloth and iron—currencies that lost value. He also emphasizes that the Atlantic slave trade led to the loss of a workforce for the benefit of European societies in the Americas. As the transoceanic slave trade increased, Europeans acquired enslaved Africans with goods that had less value than the surplus value generated by the work performed by these same slaves in the Americas. Therefore,

when in addition to the traditional currencies, Europeans introduced in Africa trading goods that held more value than the imported currencies and costed less than locally produced items, inflation increased in West Africa in the late seventeenth century. Green ultimately argues that asymmetrical exchanges contributed to the rise of militarized states such as Dahomey and furthered social unrest that destabilized African societies.³³ Rodney had made a similar argument when he emphasized that when European cloth became “dominant on the African market, it meant that African producers either abandoned their tasks in the face of cheap available European cloth” by producing at a smaller scale for local consumption or by stagnating their production altogether.³⁴

In the past few years, historians have hardly corroborated Rodney’s idea that during the era of the Atlantic slave trade European articles sold to Africans were “of the worst quality even as consumer goods—cheap gin, cheap gunpowder, pots and kettles full of holes, beads and other assorted rubbish.”³⁵ David Northup, for example, argued that textile and metal imports did not destroy African cloth and iron production prior to 1850, but rather complemented local production.³⁶ Through the examination of written records and material culture, Colleen Kriger and Toby Green have emphasized that the so-called baubles or trinkets such as beads and alcohol were valued currencies in West Africa.³⁷ Other historians also emphasized the role of luxurious items in lubricating the exchanges during the Atlantic slave trade.³⁸ African rulers and intermediaries developed specific tastes for particular goods. The kings of Dahomey, for example, preferred third-rate tobacco from Bahia.³⁹ On several occasions, these rulers also requested very specific items including porcelains and firearms. Moreover, they protested when European traders provided them with defective items. For example, in 1777, Jacques Guestard, then the director of the French fort in Ouidah, refused to pay compensation to Kpengla, the King of Dahomey, for defective muskets that allegedly “punctured, killed, and injured” his subjects. Therefore, by refusing to pay an indemnity, Guestard claimed to protect the interests of the French nation and slave merchants because such requests could become the norm.⁴⁰ Two decades later, existing correspondence between the rulers of Dahomey and Portugal reveals that Portuguese and Brazilian traders cheated West African traders. King Adandozan, for instance, who ruled Dahomey from 1797 to 1818 asked the Prince Regent Dom João to send him “some Colubrina rifles that do not break when shooting. The ones I buy here break when shooting. Then when I will manipulate the rifles, I will say ‘that thing came from the hand of my Brother’.”⁴¹

Adandozan stressed that despite being illiterate, Africans fulfilled their word, whereas Europeans were dishonest. In a letter of 1804, the Dahomean

king complained that the Portuguese fort storekeeper was watering down the barrels of *aguardente* with which he purchased enslaved people. In the same letter, Adandozan also complained that both the storekeeper and the new director of the Portuguese fortress were stealing and lowering the price of captives: “what is worth one ounce, he buys for one head, whereas the captives that cost thirteen ounces he pays five, and men, and women who cost eight, he pays three.”⁴² In 1810, Adandozan made additional complaints about Portuguese merchants who used counterfeit gold and silver to buy African captives. According to the ruler, these traders falsified the weight of *fazendas* (goods) and purchased captives with fake pieces of silk and velvet. Therefore, these documented complaints can at least partly support Rodney’s statement that Europeans purchased enslaved Africans with rubbish. Likewise, further, much-needed studies focusing on the material culture of the Atlantic slave trade can also add more nuance to his claims and bring to light the role of objects of prestige and luxurious artifacts in the Atlantic slave trade that can hardly be defined as rubbish. Finally, regardless of these debates, there is no doubt that *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* remains an enormous source of inspiration for several generations of historians.

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Notes

1. Walter Rodney, “Slavery and Other Forms of Social Possession on the Upper Guinea Coast in the Context of the Atlantic Slave Trade,” *Journal of African History* 7, no. 4 (1966): 431–443, and Walter Rodney, *A History of Upper Guinea Coast, 1545 to 1800* (London: Monthly Review Press Classics, 1970).

2. On Rodney’s international activism, see Charisse Burden-Stelly, “Between Radicalism and Repression: Walter Rodney’s Revolutionary Praxis,” *Black Perspectives*, May 6, 2019, <https://www.aaihs.org/between-radicalism-and-repression-walter-rodnays-revolutionary-praxis/>.

3. Notably Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” *Monthly Review* 18, no. 4 (1966): 17–31, Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), and Celso Furtado, *Development and Underdevelopment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). The two books are cited in Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington DC: Howard University Press, 1981).

4. Here I am referring especially to Toby Green, *The Rise of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in Western Africa, 1300–1589* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and *A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019).

5. See Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* 69. On the concept of mode of production and slavery, see Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 267–280.

6. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 43.

7. On cowry shells see Jan Hogendorn and Marion Johnson, *The Shell Money of the Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and Mariana P. Candido, *An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela and Its Hinterland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 48. On cowry shells and other currencies see Colleen E. Kriger, *Making Money: Life, Death, and Early Modern Trade on Africa's Guinea Coast* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017), 18–19, Bin Yang, *Cowrie Shells and Cowrie Money: A Global History* (New York: Routledge, 2018), Green, *A Fistful of Shells*, 17, and Carlos da Silva Jr., “Enslaving Commodities: Tobacco, Gold, Cowry Trade and Trans-Imperial Networks in the Bight of Benin (c. 1690s–c. 1790s),” *African Economic History* 49, no 2 (2021): 1–30.

8. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 75.

9. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 137.

10. See Phyllis M. Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast, 1576–1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations on the Vili Kingdom of Loango* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

11. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 114. On Christianity in the Kingdom of Kongo, see Cécile Fromont, *The Art of Conversion: Christian Visual Culture in the Kingdom of Kongo*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014).

12. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 47.

13. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 69.

14. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 78.

15. Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 81.

16. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 77.

17. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 87.

18. On the concept of the second slavery see Dale Tomich, “The ‘Second Slavery’: Bonded Labor and the Transformation of the Nineteenth-Century World Economy,” in *Rethinking the Nineteenth Century: Movements and Contradictions*, ed. Francisco O. Ramirez (Westport: Praeger, 1988), 103–107. Very few works, however, have addressed the impact of the second slavery in Africa. See Dale W. Tomich and Paul E. Lovejoy, eds. *The Atlantic and Africa: The Second Slavery and Beyond* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2021).

19. See Charles Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), Jemima Pierre, *The Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the Politics of Race* (University of Chicago Press, 2012), and Achille Mbembe and Laurent Dubois, *Critique of Black Reason* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

20. Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1969).

21. See the Transatlantic slave trade database, <https://www.slavevoyages.org/>.

22. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 96.

23. John Donnelly Fage, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Context of West African History," *Journal of African History* 10, no. 3 (1969): 404. I first surveyed this debate on the numbers' game in Ana Lucia Araujo, *Public Memory of Slavery: Victims and Perpetrators in the South Atlantic* (Amherst: Cambria Press, 2010), 26–31. Mariana P. Candido also addressed these demographic debates especially regarding West Central Africa, see Candido, *An African Slave Port*, 143–147.

24. See Christopher C. Wrigley, "Historicism in Africa: Slavery and State Formation," *African Affairs* 70, no. 279 (1971): 115 and Joseph E. Inikori, "The Slave Trade and the Atlantic Economies, 1451–1870," in *The African Slave Trade From the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century: Reports and Papers of the Meeting of Experts* (Paris: Unesco, 1979), 56–87; Joseph C. Inikori, "Under-Population in Nineteenth-Century West Africa: The Role of the Export Slave Trade," *African Historical Demography* 11 (1981): 283–313.

25. John Thornton, "The Slave Trade in Eighteenth Century Angola: Effects on Demographic Structures," *Revue Canadienne des études africaines/Canadian Journal of African Studies* 14, no. 3 (1981): 417–427, and Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730–1830* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

26. Patrick Manning, "The Enslavement of Africans: A Demographic Model," *Revue Canadienne des études africaines/Canadian Journal of African Studies* 15, no. 3 (1981): 501.

27. Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

28. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery*, 21.

29. David Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) and David Eltis and Lawrence C. Jennings, "Trade Between Western Africa and the Atlantic World in the Pre-Colonial Era," *American Historical Review* 43, no. 4 (1988): 936–959.

30. Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Africa: A Review of the Literature," *The Journal of African History* 30, no. 3 (1989): 365–394.

31. Fage, "African Societies and the Atlantic Slave Trade," 110–111. On Fage's answer, see Joseph E. Inikori, "Ideology Versus the Tyranny of Paradigm: Historians and the Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on African Societies," *African Economic History* 22 (1994): 37–58.

32. Inikori, "Ideology Versus the Tyranny of Paradigm."

33. See Green, *A Fistful of Shells*, 295.

34. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 105.

35. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 102.

36. David Northrup, *Africa's Discovery of Europe, 1450–1850* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 91.

37. Kriger, *Making Money*, 47, and Green, *A Fistful of Shells*, 13–15; 89.

38. See for example Hilary Jones, *The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 89, and Jessica

Marie Johnson, *Wicked Flesh: Black Women, Intimacy, and Freedom in the Atlantic World* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2020), 75.

39. See Pierre Verger, *Flux et reflux de la traite des nègres entre le Golfe de Bénin et Bahia de Todos os Santos, du XVIIe au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Mouton, 1969).

40. Archives départementales de la Charente Maritime, La Rochelle, France 41 ETP 217/6659, fl. 1v.

41. Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Lata 137, Pasta 62, Doc. 2, f. 5, 9 October 1810. To know more about this correspondence, see Ana Lucia Araujo, “Dahomey, Portugal, and Bahia: King Adandozan and the Atlantic Slave Trade,” *Slavery and Abolition* 3 no. 1 (2012): 1–19.

42. Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Lata 137, Pasta 62, Doc.1, ff.3–3v, n.d. This letter is not dated, but was probably written in 1804 and sent with the Dahomean embassy that arrived in Brazil in 1805.